Critical Minerals: Defense

Rule Investment Newsletter #8

Critical minerals and strategic vulnerability of supply chains have swept across headlines because of the growing realization that China has a dominant production and refining position in many metals and minerals. The strategic risk of this to Western countries is palpable, revisiting concerns of the weaponization of oil in the 1970s, particularly when the next best source of supply is Russia or other nations not aligned with the US, who are concerned by the weaponization of the US dollar. In terms of actual weapons, access to critical minerals is one factor that determines who has the best, most effective weapons.

This is the key message in Mining is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining: How China’s Critical Minerals Strategy Is Reshaping the New World Order by authors Marta Rivera and Eduardo Zamanillo. They contend that critical minerals (lithium, copper, rare earths, nickel, graphite) are no longer commodities, but the invisible infrastructure of power, with the power in the hands of those who control the midstream and downstream. China’s advantage is that it understood this decades before the West.

The Trump administration takes this threat seriously (as did the Biden administration) with measures such as Executive Order 14241 of March 2025 on Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production to boost domestic supply chains to have access to the good stuff with which its weapons systems depend. The US government has also been issuing stimulating grants and loans. On August 13th, President Trump announced US$1B in financing for critical minerals projects, although this is barely scratching the surface of the funding required to rebuild a critical minerals industry. John Feneck of Feneck Consulting told us:

“It’s a great headline, but $1B will do nothing. It is hard to say that it is even a start. It is not doing anything to fast-track projects. We really need Trump to say, let’s take a closer look at permitting.”

The US government is making funding available through the US Department of War (DoW), US Department of Energy (DoE) and US EXIM bank, but it should be noted that Trump’s supply chain actions are conflated with his overall desire to reshore production capacity and create jobs. Government funding seeks to finance metallurgical testing, the completion of feasibility studies and project construction.

The Financial Times reported on October 12th that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) of the DoW is to buy up to $1B worth of critical minerals after China announced additional export restrictions on REE. President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBA) allocated $7.5B for critical minerals, including $2B to expand the national stockpile by 2027. DLA purchasing budgets include $500M for cobalt, $245M of antimony, $100M of tantalum, and $45M of scandium. Australia is also looking to develop a A$1.2B strategic reserve of critical minerals. However, defence requirements can be deposit-specific. For example, DLAs plans to acquire $500M of alloy-grade cobalt specified it must come from Vale’s Port Colborne or Long Harbour operations in Canada, Glencore’s Nikkelwerk operation in Norway, or Sumitomo’s Japan operations. Dow later cancelled the cobalt tender.

It is not just the US government investing in critical industries. On October 13th, JPMorganChase launched a $1.5T security and resiliency initiative to boost critical industries, including critical minerals.

To coordinate efforts to develop mineral supply chains, Trump appointed former Newmont executive, David Copley to serve as the top mining official at the US National Energy Dominance Council. Copley is understood to be meeting with mining company executives to identify companies it wants to work with, focusing its efforts and funding rather than diluting them over a broad spread of juniors with little chance of success. For example, Copley met with Adam Lundin, the chair of the Lundin group, which owns shareholdings in companies developing critical minerals in North America, including copper, tungsten, and zinc. An Arizona copper developer executive told us:

The environment to support critical minerals projects is the best I have seen. Trump has brought in very transactional people, ex-Wall St, and they want to do transactions.”

A challenge for the government is to advance a coherent policy that incentivises both upstream and downstream development to have a critical minerals supply chain. The Biden administration provided support for downstream markets but did little to develop upstream mineral supply. Trump is focusing on upstream aspects, and not on so much on creating downstream demand. This is important, as military demand alone will not support the entire supply chain.

Many companies are asking the government to solve their ills, especially since the July announcement that the DoW will invest $500M in rare earths company MP Minerals, which has a 45,000tpy Mountain Pass mine in California and is building a REE processing plant in Texas. The idea seems to be that the US government wants to create a domestic champion. To help it along, it DoW will also provide guaranteed pricing, which pricked the ears of many wannabe aspirant critical minerals juniors. Some argue that price floors are necessary to neutralise the low prices of Chinese minerals that prevent Western producers from being economically viable. Others argue consumers need to adjust to the reality of higher pricing to ensure a stable supply.

It seems the White House may not fully appreciate the importance of price for producers to be economic, instead viewing it through the lens of a consumer, and looking to replicate China’s market flood that destroyed pricing in several commodities. After signing an $8.5B critical minerals agreement with Australia on October 20th, Trump suggested that within 12 months, there would be so many critical minerals and rare earths “that you won’t know what to do with them. They’ll be worth about $2”. What do others say about pricing? Chilean minerals research consultancy GEM (Gestión y Economía Minera) told us:

“History shows floors/bands only work durably when the sponsor has market power, inelastic residual demand, and credible financing/enforcement to manage inventories and deter free riding. Any price floor needs a credible buyer of last resort, transparent benchmarks, and sufficient firepower to intervene when prices fall. Without this, floors leak value and stockpiles become costly to hold and hard to unwind.”

Ramon Barua, chief executive of rare earth developer Aclara Resources told us:

Our industry is in a paradox: we need these critical elements, but industry is not ready to pay higher prices for it because it has been buying from China for such a long time. There needs to be a transition, and this transition period is where governments can play an important role, helping to reduce the upfront cost of capital by investing directly, providing loan guarantees and grants, and lowering the lower cost of capital.”

Rather than price floors and investing in small companies, Matt Fernley, editor of Battery Materials Review sees using the DLA as a better method for the US government to obtain the minor minerals it needs, through offtake agreements and issuing supply requests for specific grades at certain price points.

“The DLA can build stockpiles of what it needs to not mess around in the minor metals with small companies.”

SPEED

Addressing the point Feneck made above, critical minerals developers in the US will be among the potential winners if a bill before Congress to accelerate project permitting is passed. House Natural Resources Committee chair, Bruce Westerman introduced the Standardizing Permitting and Expediting Economic Development (SPEED) Act in September to modernise the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that governs project permitting on federal lands. This aims to facilitate the development of mining and energy projects, transmission lines, and pipelines. The proposal includes deadlines for court reviews of permitting decisions, reducing the statute of limitations for permitting lawsuits to one year or less, and restricting judicial standing for litigating projects to parties who submitted detailed comments during public review. Bill sponsor Bruce Westerman said:

“America’s model of successful environmental stewardship alongside strong economic growth is being hobbled by a more than half-century-old permitting process that is overdue for a tune-up. Although well-intentioned, NEPA has not kept up with the times, which is bad for both our environment and our economy. With commonsense upgrades, we can cut red tape and enable the US to build once again while setting the standard for environmental stewardship.”

The bill’s sponsors say that the NEPA process has become a tool used by special interest groups to block infrastructure and is the most litigated environmental statute in the nation. NGOs filed more than 70% of all lawsuits filed under NEPA in recent years, according to the Breakthrough Institute, with litigants losing their challenges 80% of the time. It said litigation under NEPA added an average of four years to a project’s timeline, a delay that can kill a project even when litigation fails.

Why are we here?

As China opened its economy and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, the Western world thought it would benefit from its cheap labor and abundant raw materials. For a couple of decades, it did, but at a cost, as mineral production and manufacturing were offshored to China. China developed excess capacity in producing and processing many mineral commodities, which flooded the market, collapsing pricing and leading to the closure of production capacity in the US and Western Europe. There is not new. Trade groups representing mineral producers, from steel and aluminum to graphite and silicon carbide, have brought anti-dumping petitions before the WTO for decades, and continue to do so. Decades of selling minerals cheaply mean that China too faces a shortage of key critical minerals, and export restrictions come as it wants to reserve those it has for its own industry.

Addressing the hollowing out of US production capacity is a central theme of the Trump administration, given the military, industrial and economic vulnerabilities it creates. In August, the US Department of the Interior released a draft for the 2025 critical mineral list with the addition of copper, potash, silver, silicon, rhenium and lead, with arsenic and tellurium dropped. The list now numbers 54 elements. The potential GDP loss from foreign trade disruptions is illustrated in Exhibit 1. It is an interesting read. The economic impact of terbium (Tb) is $1.8B, dysprosium (Dy) $1.6B, tungsten is $539M, neodymium (Nd) $383M, praseodymium (Pr) $165M, antimony $129M and tin $32M.

Exhibit 1: Percent Change in the Annual Average Gold and Silver Price

Source: Visual Capitalist, using USGS data

When looking at critical minerals, details are important. There are 17 minerals classified as rare earths. The most critical from a military vulnerability perspective are the HREE, such as Nd-Pr. Many projects claim to have antimony. There are more than 100 antimony minerals, but stibnite is the most important. As noted above, the military applications for many minerals are relatively low volume with a project developer likely to produce a range of grades in addition to the high-end military spec fraction, which they have to find markets for. The low volume of most critical minerals markets means a new source of production can quickly oversupply and destroy pricing. Melissa Sanderson, director of American Rare Earths, said this at the FT Metals and Mining Summit in London in October:

“The defense market is small. Lockheed Martin will tell you it is going to build 50 satellites. They’re not going to build 50,000. Most of you in this room know that the $500M-plus investment to build a mine is not going to be driven by the 50 satellites it is building.”

Investors

For the investor, the critical minerals theme presents an opportunity to invest in companies that will become champions of the US supply chain. This sounds easy enough but there are many pitfalls as, in true junior style, many exploration juniors have reviewed their assay logs for any hint of a critical mineral component that they can promote to the unprepared, reinventing themselves as critical minerals companies, with a business plan that looks no further than mining US government funding. An outcrop that assays for rare earths does not make a critical minerals company.

The returns can be massive though, with the zeitgeist propelling share prices to astronomical heights, particularly for companies the US government supports. In early October 2025, the US government said it would take a 10% interest in Alaska copper developer Trilogy Metals, which saw its stock jump more than 200%. This followed a July announcement that it would take a majority stake in rare earths company MP Materials, which has jumped 300%, and US graphite company Titan Mining is up 500% in the past six months. Here is Adiani again:

“The reality is that we are asking for downside protection, and if the government says that the cost of providing that is [government] having part of the upside, that is not unreasonable. This administration is very commercial, and is very honest in saying that if it is going to scale [critical minerals projects] there will be equity upside, and it should take some of that.”

Not all CEO’s agree. Here is Almonty Industries’s Lewis Black:

“The US government does not align with other shareholders as they want material while shareholders want value. Governments come and go so what happens with that ownership?”

To benefit, investors need to attune to what the government wants. Rita Adiani, CEO of Titan Mining said the US government wants to see a domestic demand signal (including DLA stockpiling initiatives and commercial offtake contracts, positive pricing aspects and potential ownership. Adiani told us:

The key aspects it is looking for are a very strong domestic demand signal, price protection, and upside participation.”

Investors need to understand that US policy is not mining critical mineral raw materials per se, but rather developing supply chains to access usable products for the military-industrial complex. The government will not fund a mine into production if it has to sell its mined materials to China for processing and refining. This is a crucial nuance, and some think governments will not fund mines at all. Here is what trading company Trafigura CEO Richard Holtum said at the LME Metals Seminar on October 12th:

“Mining is not critical. You do not have national security if you just have stuff in the ground. Dirt in the ground is completely useless unless you have the capacity to turn it into something useful. Mining is not critical; you can get stuff from a lot of places in the world. Smelting is absolutely critical.”

Our intent is to focus on the most investible minerals. We will deliberately avoid minerals that are so niche that most people had never heard of, which means we are giving a wide berth to scandium, gallium, germanium and things of that ilk. We are not confident in investing in such things and it would be remiss to include them within an investment theme for our readers. We will also differentiate between energy minerals (lithium, graphite, copper and uranium), which will be addressed in a subsequent issue of RIN, with those with defense applications (tungsten, antimony, rare earths and tin), to be addressed here.

A challenge for the investor is the limited opportunities to invest in domestic minerals opportunities. With that in mind, we have taken the liberty of including some companies that trade on North American stock markets and have projects in US-friendly countries, which have a reasonable expectation of supplying mineral products to the US. As we are focused on minerals and mining, we will also avoid mineral processors.

Critical mineral investment considerations include: governments are interested in supporting products into production or to complete studies that could lead to a production decision, and not exploration; governments are interested in supply chains and not in producing ore from a deposit, and so processing needs to be part of the plan; small juniors will likely be left out in the cold as government focus on companies with clout; having the ability to navigate Washington is rapidly becoming part of a CEOs required skillset.

Exhibit 2: How Rare Earths Power US Defense

Source: Unknown

Rare Earth Elements

It was China’s threat to impose restrictions to the export of rare earth elements (REE) that ignited critical minerals anxiety in the West when it imposed export restrictions in 2023 on certain REE and related technologies, and before that on Japan in 2010. More recently, in April 2025, China’s Minister of Commerce introduced further export restrictions in response to tariff measures from President Trump, and urged neighboring countries, including South Korea, not to export REE to US defense contractors.

REE are used to make magnets that are essential to advanced military technologies, including precision-guided missiles, radar systems, and fighter jets (see Exhibit 2). The most critical REE for these applications are the light rare earths (LREE), Nd-Pr, and the heavy rare earths (HREE) Dy-Tb.

The US Geological Service (USGS) estimates that China hosts 44Mt of REE, and its southern neighbor Vietnam, 22Mt. Russia and India also have resources, while the US has a lowly 1.8Mt. Trump’s thoughts of benefitting from Greenland’s 1.5Mt of REE, or resources in Ukraine, are likely little more than thoughts. Again, this is indicative of the existence of a perceived vulnerability. How critical are REE? In September 2025, the G7 countries and the European Union said they are considering price floors backed by government subsidies to promote their production, in the face of bottlenecks in China’s export license system. GEM told us:

“Diversifying away from a single dominant supplier in REEs is a legitimate economic-security goal, but a generalized price floor would likely be leaky, costly and politically fragile without market power and deep financing. The dominant strategy is midstream-first, reinforced by standards-based procurement and recycling/substitution. If a floor is used at all, treat it as a narrow, time-limited backstop for NdPr/Dy/Tb, with explicit exit rules.”

There are 15-17 REE, which usually occur together in a deposit, most of which are the LREE. Mines are usually geared to optimise production of Nd-Pr, which is a market of about 80,000tpy worth about $4.8B/y. Nd-Pr represents 16-23% of the total rare earth oxide of the world’s main mines. The major REE mines are located in carbonatite systems, which have very low concentrations of HREEs. To produce HREE, such as Dy-Tb used in NdFeB magnets, you have to produce LREE as they also pass through the beneficiation process. Producers have limited ability to increase HREE output and when they do, they flood LREE markets, destroying pricing.

Ionic clay deposits see natural weathering processes enrich and concentrate HREE. In addition, the ionic part of ionic clay means that the HREE are adsorbed onto the surface of the clay mineral with a weak bond that is easily broken using a leaching agent like ammonium sulfate. Ionic clay deposits can deliver substantially more HREE per unit of NdPr than carbonatite deposits, with a ratio of 1:5 rather than 1:200.

Processing is key with REE, and for companies aspiring to obtain US government funding, having a viable processing solution or a well-defined downstream supply chain is a critical success factor. MP Materials is building its own facility in Texas, while Aclara Resources is considering building one in Louisiana.

We are just scratching the surface here. For a more detailed look at REE investing, please refer to this tour de force from Matt Fernley.

Outside the US, friendly countries, such as Brazil, which hosts the largest REE resources in the Americas at 21Mt, anticipate an opportunity opening as it has ionic clay deposits. At least 15 companies are exploring for REEs in Brazil, but the US does not have the field to itself, as China Molybdenum and China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group are active there.

Brazil’s opportunity is proving to be a movable feast. Former US President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) included working with friendly nations. The US does not consider Brazil a foreign entity of concern (FEOC), which aligns it with IRA, and it seemed there were the makings of a strategic relationship. Trump has culled much of IRA, however, and his tariffs (50% on Brazil) mean that countries which believed they were friends of the US, are no longer so certain. Like Chile and Peru, Brazil has followed a policy of non-alignment, serving clients in the USA and China. Trump’s combative stance against Brazil’s President Lula could push Brazil away, and Trump could overplay his hand. David Merriman, research director at London’s Project Blue consultancy, told us:

Different levers are reshaping trade flows and the diversification of supply chains. Regionalization may replace globalization. There may be trading blocs rather than free trade.”

Exhibit 1: Percent Change in the Annual Average Gold and Silver Price

Source: CPM Group

Tungsten

Tungsten is a hardening agent used on the tips of missiles and other munitions to give penetration, as well as to give penetration resistance in armor. It has a plethora of other industrial applications, including as a nanofilament that makes the chips that power AI possible. In 2024, 81% of the world’s tungsten was produced by China, which in February 2025, announced it would cease exporting it, sending prices to all-time highs.

Tungsten has not been mined in the US since 2015, which made the December 2024 decision of the Biden administration to impose an import tariff of up to 25% on tungsten products a headscratcher, especially since the DLA tungsten stockpile is exhausted and the DoW is barred from using tungsten from China, Russia or North Korea from 2027.

There are handful of companies in mining-friendly Nevada and Canada with tungsten exploration and development projects, often looking to restart former mines. There are also US processing options available through companies such as Global Tungsten & Powders. The tungsten supply chain is so stressed that Global Tungsten & Powders has begun importing it from Trinity Metals Nyakabingo mine in Rwanda, which in 2024, secured a $3.87M technical assistance grant funding from the International Development Finance Corporation.

Tungsten’s military applications mean that project developers have reasonable expectations of receiving DoW funding, particularly as Lewis Black, CEO of Almonty Industries, believes that Western supply chains have deteriorated to such an extent that the West’s discourse can only be about national security issues:

“China hasn’t focused on defence, but the West has because that comes before everything else. … An act of aggression by a Communist government sounds better than saying we were sold cheap material and we loved it, that we were seduced and started sleeping in the wrong bed, then couldn’t leave.”

US investment opportunities largely aim to reopen past-producing mines that operated in the 1950s and 1960s, which were not mechanised and never had vast resources. An additional challenge for aspirant developers is processing, because tungsten is both tough and fragile. Black told us:

“Every mine in the last 15 years has failed because processing is so difficult. Tungsten has the density of gold, but it is more brittle than porcelain. Tungsten is an incredibly obnoxious material that is a nightmare to process. You need reinforcement in your LHDs because it will strip a steel bucket in a month, but if you don’t handle it sensitively, it will dissipate into dust. That is why many mines only got 25% recovery.”

Antimony

As with other critical minerals, antimony’s biggest markets by volume are relatively mundane, with antimony oxide mainly used as a flame retardant in plastic, fabrics and other materials. A niche market, at about 8%, is in munitions and defense applications. In the words US Antimony chair & CEO, Gary Evans:

“You may not realize it, but there’s not a bullet fired in the world without antimony in it.”

Supply is dominated by China and Russia (>70%). The market is relatively small at about 72,000tpy, and China implemented antimony export controls in 2024. Supply disruptions have seen prices surge from $1,400/t in July 2024 to $38,000/t in September 2024 and subsequently to $60,000/t this year. Antimony is mainly produced as a byproduct with other metals, such as gold. This makes it difficult to invest in per se, with exposure typically via investing in a gold company. Its increasing value sees gold companies scour their databases to find it. Perpetua Resources estimates that antimony will provide its Stibnite gold project in Idaho with a $220/oz byproduct credit over its life.

Tin

Tin is mainly used for soldering circuit boards, and its demand is forecast to increase with the growth of AI, data centres, semiconductors and solar energy. It is vital in electronics, electric vehicles, advanced robotics, and many other electronic and digital applications. With historical demand growth of 2%–3% per annum, and few sources, supply is unlikely to keep up with demand, and prices are set to increase. China doesn’t dominate production to the same extent as other critical minerals (the top four suppliers of refined tin to the US are Peru, Bolivia, Brazil and Indonesia), however, it supplied 85.97% of US imports of tin-lead solder in 2024. Other leading exporters of tin solder are Vietnam and Japan. China also represents about half of the 377,000tpy of annual demand.

Rule Investments

In looking at some of the investment opportunities in the defense critical minerals space, we will first look at companies Rick has invested in, and then some of the broader spectrum of companies that Rick is reviewing, but has not (yet) invested in.

Aclara Resources www.aclara-re.com

Share price change YoY 808%

Brazil has geological potential for REE, but there is a lot of work to do, as its production is only about 80tpa, less than 1% of the global total. Brazilian REE developer Aclara Resources (TSX:ARA) is focused on integrating along the value chain with a mine-to-magnet vertical integration strategy, including mining, separation, alloy production and possibly magnets. It contemplates the development of ionic clay REE deposits at Carina in Goiás, Brazil and Penco near Concepcion in Chile characterized by concentrations of HREEs relative to LREEs.

Paul undertook a site visit to Carina in July 2025, which features a free-digging regolith, meaning it can be excavated with a shovel rather than requiring drilling and blasting, thereby saving significant mining and processing costs. A 2024 preliminary economic assessment (PEA) outlined a 22-year mine life to produce 203Mt of process plant feed and 4,736tpa of total rare earth oxides (TREO), including 1,248tpa of NdPr, 163t of Dy and 28t of Tb with 95% recovery, from a resource of 297.6Mt @ 1,452ppm TREO that included 284ppm NdPr, 39ppm Dy and 6ppm Tb. Aclara considers TREO a misleading figure as it includes low-valued REE it has no intention of producing. Instead, it focuses on desorbable rare earth oxides.

In October, Aclara updated the resource estimate for Carina, including its first indicated resources to 236Mt @ 1,572 TREO containing 371,492t of TREO. The indicated resource includes dysprosium oxide at 42.7ppm, terbium oxide at 6.8ppm and NdPr oxide (Nd₂O₃ & Pr₆O₁₁) at 292.6ppm. Aclara said the PFS will be delivered in 45 days, which is mid-November.

Aclara has a 2tpd pilot plant in Goiás state capital Goiânia that uses off-the-shelf equipment to provide proof of concept that Aclara can produce rare earth oxides from Carina and Penco material. The product will ultimately be used as a feedstock for a separation plant it wants to build in the US. About 1kg of the product contains about 400g of TREO. Of this 20-25% are LREE and 4-5% the HREE Aclara is focused on. The USGS states that Dy-Tb are the most supply-constrained REE with the most supply risk. Aclara is targeting production of 241t/y before 2030, which it estimates is 16% of Chinese production, and enough to satisfy 50% of US auto demand in 2030 and 100% of US defence industry demand. A feasibility study was initiated in July 2025 and is expected to be completed in March 2026.

Aclara expects to start up the first train of a test rare earths separation plant it has developed with Virginia Tech to validate its technology. The facility implementation at the Virginia Tech Corporate Research Center, will showcase Aclara’s solvent extraction technology for producing individual high-purity LREE and HREE. It is expected to produce over 99.5% pure didymium (Nd-Pr), Tb, and Dy from concentrate from the pilot plant. The company is also close to deciding on a site for the construction of a commercial plant in Louisiana close to the chemical industry that has the reagents it will need.

Barua sees an opportunity for Aclara’s mine-to-magnet approach to become a key supplier for the US Department of Defense, which plans to build a permanent magnet facility in South Carolina, which will require HREE. Here is chief executive Ramon Barua:

“MP will produce high levels of light rare earths, but to produce magnets, the DoW will need HREE, which is where Aclara comes in. We are perfectly complementary and can supply the elements that are missing in that equation.”

Aclara received a $5M funding commitment from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to help fund the Carina feasibility study. Whether or not US government grants materialise or not for Aclara, its core shareholders include Hochschild Mining and Chilean iron and steel company CAP, that intend to take Aclara into production, which means they are likely to underwrite the $1.3B estimated capex, with a production start in 2028.

Meteoric Resources www.meteoric.com.au

Share price change YoY 158%

Similarly, Meteoris Resources (ASX:MEI) is looking at exploiting an ionic clay resource at Caldeira in Minas Gerais, Brazil which it says is the largest ionic adsorption clay deposit in the world by tonnage and grade. It hosts a resource of 1.5Bt @ 2,359ppm TREO, including 666Mt grading 2,685ppm in the M&I category. The deposit is enriched in magnet elements Dy-Tb and Nd-Pr.

The company issued a prefeasibility study in July 2025 for a first phase targeting 13,500tpy of TREO for 20 years from a 6Mtpy processing facility with first production in 2028. This includes average NdPr production of 4,228tpy following development capex of $443M. The metallurgical testwork was conducted with Australia’s Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and developed a flowsheet resulting in high recoveries through the application of a low-cost, low-impact ammonium sulfate wash. This flowsheet will be de-risked with the construction and commissioning of a pilot plant at Poços de Caldas in late 2025 that will produce 2km of mixed rare earths carbonate (MREC) per day when in operation.

Meteoric has signed MOUs with several counterparties looking at downstream processing, separation capabilities, and magnet production, including with Ucore Rare Metals for a rare earth separation at a new facility in Louisiana. The company aims to receive an Installation License in June 2026, which will allow it to commence construction. Its Preliminary License is due to be approved in November 2025. Another MoU was signed with Metallium for the potential use of its proprietary Flash Joule Heating technology to separate high-value magnetic elements (Nd, Pr, Dy and Tb) from MREC. The development of a pilot plant in 2026 will help advance this test work and other offtake and downstream opportunities.

Alphamin Resources www.alphaminresources.com

Share price change YoY -10%

The fragile nature of supply chains was evident when Alphamin Resources (TSX:AFM, OTC:AFMJF) had to abandon its Bisie operations in the DRC after a Rwanda-backed M23 rebel insurgency. However, with the crisis resolved, the company produced 4,106t of tin in 2Q25 following a phased operational restart on 15 April. Exploration aims to increase the Mpama North and Mpama South resource base and life of mine, and discover new deposits in close proximity to Bisie.

A proximity play to Alphamin is Roma Resources www.romeresources.com, (TSX:RMR) which began drilling the Bisie North tin project in August 2025, and is now preparing a maiden resource estimate.

Other companies of interest

USA Rare Earth www.usare.com

Share price change YoY 249%

Highlighting the need for a vertically-integrated supply chain, USA Rare Earth (Nasdaq:USAR) is to acquire the UK’s Less Common Metals (LCM), a rare earth metal and alloy producer, to accelerate its mine-to-magnet strategy. This includes the development of a 5,000tpy magnet facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma. USAR will acquire LCM for $100M in cash and $25M in stock (6.74M shares). LCM produces rare earth metals and cast and strip cast alloys in Cheshire, UK, and will supply NdPr rare-earth metal alloys and strip cast feedstock to Stillwater. That $100M buy saw USARs share price jump 30% to an all-time high of $23.36, and a $2.61B market capitalization. The company is looking to produce Dy from its Texas Round Top mine project. USAR chair Michael Blitzer said …

“Midstream metal making is the linchpin of the global supply chain and LCM is the only proven ex-China producer of rare earth metal, alloys, and strip casting at scale.”

Almonty Industries www.almonty.com

Share price change YoY 562%

Almonty Industries (NASDAQ:ALM) has been one of the stars of the tungsten angst, with production coming on stream from the 25000t/y Sangdong operation in US-friendly South Korea. The company listed on the NASDAQ as part of a US relocation strategy to align with its focus on supplying the US military. It is currently the sole Western company involved in the tungsten supply chain, with plans to build a tungsten oxide smelter in South Korea to become the only vertically integrated tungsten smelter outside China. Almonty said it will be able to supply US defense needs, and an estimated 63% what the European Union requires under the new directive for NATO members to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. Earlier in 2025, Almonty signed a binding offtake agreement for tungsten oxide supply exclusively for US defense applications. In 2018, it signed a 10-year offtake agreement with Plansee Group, a US-based tungsten and molybdenum processor. The agreement covers 45% of production and includes a price floor that guarantees Almonty a minimum revenue of C$500 million. The company also secured a $75.1 million loan from German state bank KfW IPEX.

Fireweed Metals www.fireweedmetals.com

Share price change YoY 119%

Fireweed Metals (TSXV:FWZ | OTCQX:FWEDF) has two critical minerals projects in Yukon, Canada. Mactung, which is said to be the world’s largest high-grade tungsten deposit, concerns us here, but it also has the nearby Macpass zinc project. Remember we said Adam Lundin, chair of the Lundin group, met with David Copely in DC? If the Trump administration chooses to work with a handful of bigger organizations rather than a multitude of smaller juniors, Fireweed could benefit, being a Lundin company. The company was awarded $15.8 million by the DoW and up to C$12.9 million from the Government of Canada in support of its critical minerals projects. The company received the DoW funds under Title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to advance its Mactung tungsten project toward a feasibility study and final investment decision. Mactung hosts a 2023 indicated resource of 41.5Mt grading 0.73% WO3 and 12.2Mt of inferred resources (see Exhibit xx). The Macpass deposit hosts a 2024 indicated resource of 56Mt grading 5.49% zinc, 1.58% lead and 24.2gpt silver for a 7.27% zinc equivalent and 48.49Mt of inferred resources. An updated feasibility study will begin this year, with the company targeting a final investment decision in 2028.

Guardian Metal Resources www.guardianmetalresources.com

Share price change YoY 446%

Guardian Metal Resources (OTCQB:GMTLF) has two onshore-US past-producing assets, Pilot Mountain and Tempiute in Nevada, and in July 2025, it received $6.2M from the DoW under Title III of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to move the Pilot Mountain project to prefeasibility and permitting. As such, Guardian is rapidly moving from an explorer to a developer. Pilot Mountain is believed to be the largest undeveloped tungsten deposit in the US. The Tempiute project was formerly the Emerson mine, which was mined in the 1930s and most recently by Union Carbide, from 1977 to 1987, from two tabular-shaped ore bodies. Six high-grade stockpiles exist within the project area. The project hosts a historical resource of 8Mt @ 0.43% WO3. The company is currently drilling for a starter open pit. Pilot Mountain hosts a 2018 resource of 10.7Mt @ 0.26% WO₃, 19.38g/t Ag, 0.15% Cu & 0.38% Zn. The presence of silver and copper enhances project economics and perhaps makes it more likely to be developed first.

American Tungsten www.americantungstencorp.com

Share price change YoY 14,233%

American Tungsten (CSE:TUNG) (OTCQB:TUNGF) owns the IMA project in Idaho, a past-producing tungsten property, which it is rehabilitating. The project has a historical resource estimate of 1Mt grading 0.63% WO3, 0.042% MoS2 & 1.79oz/t Ag. About 2,000m of underground diamond drilling is planned once the mine access is rehabilitated on geophysical targets to define the scope of work to complete an updated resource estimate by year end. The company has also entered into a Letter of Intent with US-based offtake partner, Global Tungsten & Powders, one of the largest tungsten processors in the world.

Spartan Metals www.SpartanMetals.com

Share price change YoY 1,233%

An earlier-stage opportunity in Nevada is Spartan Minerals (TSXV:W), a company created by project generator Ridgeline Minerals (19.9% owner), whose Eagle project is one of the highest-grade past-producing tungsten mines in the US at about 1% WO3. It’s a 20 km2 land package that includes the past-producing Tungstonia and Rees tungsten mines, and the Antelope copper-silver mine. The historical exploration target is based on five known veins mined to ~75m depth. Field work extends the key veins from ~1km to over 2km of strike length and suggests additional veins are present.

Americas Gold & Silver www.americas-gold.com

Share price change YoY 333%.

Another US precious metals producer looking to produce byproduct antimony is Americas Gold & Silver (NYSE-A:USAS) from its Galena Complex in Idaho. Metallurgical testwork has demonstrated over 90% antimony recovery and the potential production of a marketable concentrate, potentially unlocking a new revenue stream from a previously considered penalty element. From January 1, 2026, the company will be paid by Teck Resources’ Trail smelter in British Columbia for antimony, copper and gold in its concentrates. In 2026, this could amount to 2.5-3Mlb of antimony. The company has also retained a Washington lobbyist to establish connections with the US government that could ultimately help the company be able to smelt its own antiomny.

US Antimony www.usantimony.com

Share price change YoY 2,361%

United States Antimony (NYSE-A:UAMY) is the only antimony processor within the US and has the capacity to produce 15Mlb/y of antimony oxide or 5Mlb/y of antimony metal by processing slag from the Trail smelter in British Columbia, which ultimately originates in the silver concentrate Trail receives from Americas Gold and Silver’s Galena mine. US Antimony won a $245M contract from the US Defense Logistics Agency to purchase antimony ingots to replenish the National Defense Stockpile. US Antimony is permitted to begin immediate mining operations at Thomson Falls where antimony is present in the three vein systems.

Perpetua Resources www.perpetuaresources.com

Share price change YoY 192%

Perpetua Resources (NASDAQ:PPTA) hosts the only current US reserve of antimony, with 104Mt grading 0.06% Sn containing 148Mlb of reserves, and 206Mlb of resources. Stibnite will produce an average of more than 7Mlb/y of antimony, and around 20Mlb/y during its first six years, in addition to 297,000oz/y of gold, following an initial capital expenditure of $1.3B. The company has received over $80M in Department of Defense grants since 2022, and it received a letter of interest from the US EXIM Bank for a potential debt financing of up to $1.8B through the bank’s Make More in America and China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) initiatives. More importantly, in September 2025, it received a conditional Notice to Proceed from the US Forest Service, which stated that the project satisfied all requirements outlined in the January 2025 Record of Decision and that construction may begin once bonding commitments are posted. Early works construction is expected to begin soon.

Nova Minerals

Share price change YoY 901%

Nova Minerals (NASDAQ:NVA) was awarded $43.4M in funding by the Department of War to enable it to accelerate development of a fully integrated US antimony supply chain to extract and refine stibnite to produce military grade antimony trisulfide from its 800m x 400m antimony-rich zone at Stibium on its Estelle property in Alaska. This is a headscratcher due to the project’s early stage, as it has only recently begun initial drilling to follow up on high-grade sample results. Without the DoW award, the early stage of this work would not merit inclusion in this report. Elsewhere on Estelle, Nova has four gold deposits with an aggregate of 9.9Moz of resources.

Tinka Resources www.tinkaresources.com

Share price change YoY 2%

Minsur is Peru’s only tin producer through its San Rafael mine, which produced 24,442t in 2024,with an additional 7,868t coming from the reprocessed San Rafael tailings at the B2 Pisco refinery, for a total of 30,926t of refined tin. It trades on the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL). Conscious that not everyone can or wants to invest via the BVL, another opportunity in Peru is an earlier-stage company, Tinka Resources (OTCQB:TKRFF / TSXV:TK), which recently updated its board to include Brandon MacDonald as executive chair and Michael Horner. MacDonald was previously CEO at Fireweed Metals. In 2024, Tinka issued an updated PEA for its polymetallic Ayawilca project in Cajamarca with a zinc-silver-lead plant and a separate tin plant to produce 3.26Mlb of tin over 15 years.

Cornish Metals www.cornishmetals.com

Share price change YoY 15%

Cornish Metals (TSXV:CUSN) owns the South Crofty tin mine in Cornwall, UK that is permitted and with existing mine infrastructure that aims to produce 3,500tpy of tin in concentrate for 14 years, and 4,700tpy in the first five years following a £198 million capital investment, according to a September updated PEA. With an estimated AISC of $14,500/t, South Crofty would be in the lowest quartile of the industry cost curve. First production is targeted by mid-2028.